This paper studies the influence of regional inequality within countries on internal conflicts. Regional inequalities are measured by the population-weighted coefficient of variation of regional GDP per capita. As the main innovation, I use a panel dataset of country-level regional inequalities, which covers 56 countries (835 subnational regions) between 1980 and 2009. I also consider a broader cross section dataset for the year 2005, which covers 110 countries (1569 subnational regions). Conflict is measured by the incidence of civil war (UCDP/PRIO data) and a risk measure of internal conflict (war, terrorism and riots) provided by the PRS Group's International Country Risk Guide. Logit estimations are employed as well as OLS fixed effects panel regressions. I find that regional inequalities increase the risk of internal conflict.
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the link between regional inequality within countries and internal conflicts.
Internal conflicts around the world produce human tragedies on a colossal scale, create humanitarian crises, and destabilize countries and regions. Internal conflicts are also a major reason for underdevelopment, at least due to the destruction of parts of the capital stock as a consequence of clashes. But importantly, for the negative economic consequences it is not necessary that a conflict breaks out and conflicting parties start fighting. Even the threat of conflict has negative effects, since it increases uncertainty and reduces the expected return on investment. Consequently, savings and investments slow down, and economic growth is reduced. For all of these reasons, preventing internal conflicts and reducing their intensity must be a very high policy imperative in the development agenda.
Internal conflicts are a multifaceted phenomenon. The most obvious type of violent internal conflict is armed civil war. According to the Correlates of War data (v4.1), the world has seen almost 250 civil wars since the end of the Second World War, with more than 2.3 million killed in actioncivilian casualties not included (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010) . Terrorism is another important type of violent internal conflict, where one of the conflicting parties does not seek open fights, but uses single terror attacks to achieve its aims. Also important is civil unrest. The recent Jasmine Revolution, which flashed from Tunesia over North Africa and the Middle East, has shown the importance of this kind of internal conflict. Note that the different types of conflict may also interact with each other. Knowing more about the general causes of internal conflicts might help to prevent them, saving lives and stimulating long-run social and economic development. This study focuses on interregional income inequalities within countries as a potential determinant of conflict. The idea is, that uneven development can be the breeding ground for separatist movements and greed revolutions.
There are only few studiessuch as Østby et al. (2009) , Deiwiks et al. (2012) and Buhaug et al. (2012) on the effect of regional inequalities within countries on the risk of internal conflict. The reason is not that scholars do not expect regional inequalities to be relevant, but that data on regional income inequality are difficult to obtain. While it is quite easy to access regional datanecessary for the calculation of inequality measureson high-income countries through the regional statistics provided by EUROSTAT or the OECD, it is hard to find appropriate data on low-and middle-income economies. However, both data on developed and developing countries are important for a systematic analysis of the causes of internal conflicts.
In light of this, the purpose of this study is to bring together recent data sets on regional inequality and internal conflict. Two data sets are used to calculate a measure of regional inequality. First, I use the regional data provided by Lessmann (2014) , which are based on subnational data on 56 countries (835 subnational regions). Regional inequalities within countries are measured by the population-weighted coefficient of variation (WCV) of regional GDP per capita. The dataset has a panel structure and covers the period 1980-2009. Second, I use the regional data provided by Gennaioli et al. (2013) for the calculation of similar inequality measures. This dataset covers 110 countries (1569 subnational regions), but it has no time variation. Regional economic accounts refer (mostly) to the year 2005. Also, different measures of internal conflict are considered. First of all, the estimations use the UCDP/PRIO conflict data in a similar way to Esteban et al. (2012a) . 1 In addition to this, I use the variable 'risk of internal conflict' provided by the PRS Group's International Country Risk Guide (see, e.g., Neumayer, 2004) . This conflict measure incorporates data on civil wars, terror attacks, and riots into a combined index. I have access to the data for the period . The econometric analysis closely follows Esteban et al. (2012a) , who study the effect of ethnicity on conflict. The important distinction is that I augment the estimation equations by the measure of regional inequality as an additional explanatory variable. Logit estimations (with clustered standard errors) are carried out, as well as OLS country fixed effects panel regressions. The estimations show that regional inequalities increase the probability of an internal conflict. Importantly, this result is not sensitive to the definition of civil wars or to the regional data used. This paper extends the existing literature in three directions. First, I make use of panel data of regional income inequality within countries for a large set of developed and developing countries. Related studies use either cross-section data of many countries (see Buhaug et al., 2012; Deiwiks et al., 2012) or panel data of a particular geographic region (see Østby et al., 2009) . While Østby et al. (2009) studies countries in sub-Saharan Africaand therefore predominantly lowincome countriesthe data I use have a bias toward middle-and high-income countries. This different sample selection helps to generalize the findings of the existing studies. Second, I construct a (time-varying) measure of regional income inequality within countries at the country level, which is commonly used in economic geography (see, e.g., Lessmann, 2014; Williamson, 1965) . This approach allows me to control for unobserved heterogeneity within countries by considering country fixed effects, at least in those regressions where the conflict measure is not binary coded. Moreover, the aggregation of the subnational income data to a country-level inequality measure allows for consistent estimates of the effect of regional inequality on conflict. Third, I consider the incidence of civil wars as well as a measure for the risk of internal conflict as dependent variables, thus combining different types of conflict. Since the risk indicator is also time-varying, this in turn allows me to apply standard panel data techniques.
Note that the aim of the paper is not to analyze the impact of regional inequality on one particular type of internal conflict with all its specifics in the group dynamicssuch as secessionist movements, greed revolutions, etc.rather than to investigate whether regional inequalities matter at all in this context, even if we control for unobserved heterogeneity caused, for example, by geography or history. We know from Williamson (1965) and Lessmann (2014) that regional inequalities rise if low-income countries make their way up to the group of middle-income economies. But if the growing inequalities result in internal conflicts, this process may trap countries into poverty, which is difficult to escape.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 discusses the main variables of interest: the measure of regional inequality and the indicators of internal conflict. Section 4 presents the econometric analysis. Section 5 sums up and concludes.
REGIONAL INEQUALITY AND INTERNAL CONFLICT

Theoretical literature and hypothesis
Income inequality and other kinds of polarization are important determinants of internal conflicts in the theoretical literature. In the words of Amartya Sen: 'the relationship between inequality and rebellion is indeed a close one' (Sen, 1973, opening page) . The underlying argument is intuitive. According to the Marxist theory, class differences between capital owners and the working classwhich can be understood as economic inequalitieslead to social conflicts, rebellion, and finally the destruction of the capitalist system. However, empirical evidence on the effect of interpersonal income inequalities on conflict is not as clear-cut as the theory suggests. In a review of early studies in the field, Lichbach (1989) concludes that findings on the relationship are weak and not robust. Similarly, the two perhaps most influential empirical studies in the recent conflict literature, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) , are not able to find a significant relationship.
Regional Inequality and Conflict
What are the causes of this quite puzzling empirical result on interpersonal income inequalities and conflict? In the political sciences literature, the distinction between vertical and horizontal inequalities has become a popular explanation for the inconclusiveness of empirical studies (see, e.g., Cramer, 2003; Stewart, 2000 Stewart, , 2002 . Vertical inequality refers to the inequalities within a group, for example, a group of individuals or households. Those inequalities can be measured by the Gini coefficient of the income distribution or alternative concentration measures, which are widely used in the empirical literature. By contrast, horizontal inequality refers to inequalities between groups: ethnic groups, religious groups, races, regions, etc. Stewart (2000) argues that horizontal inequalities create identity, which binds the group, and are a breeding ground for grievance. In general, ethnic and religious boundaries are a powerful source of mobilization when collective action is needed to start a rebellion. If horizontal inequality is blatant between groups, mobilization becomes much more likely.
Related to this line of reasoning is the work of the economists Joan Esteban, Laura Mayoral and Debraj Ray and colleagues. Esteban et al. (2012b) explain the inconclusiveness of the empirical studies as resulting from the opposed effects income inequality has on the risk of internal conflict. Rising inequalities are a breeding ground for resentment, making (ceteris paribus) a rebellion more likely. But at the same time, the poverty of the poor restrains them from successful insurrection, because their income is too low to purchase the necessary means. The effect of inequality on the risk of conflict is therefore ambiguous. Importantly, groups matter in this literature, too (see Ray, 1994, 2011a) . Esteban and Ray (2011b) show that inequality between groups has an ambiguous effect on the risk of internal conflict, but within-group inequality increases the risk of internal conflict. In additionsimilarly to the reasoning by Stewart (2000) abovethey show that an increase in the correlation between ethnic radicalism and inequality also increases conflict. Altogether, both strands of literature point to horizontal inequalities between groups to be decisive in the inequality-conflict nexus. Why should regionalor spatialinequalities between regions matter for the risk of internal conflict? Although the evidence on the relationship between interpersonal inequality and conflict is inconclusive, this might be an indirect transmission channel, at least from a theorist's point of view. Kanbur and Venables (2005) point out that interregional inequalities are a major determinant of interpersonal inequalities. 'Inequality between a nation's regions is one component of overall national inequality across individuals (the other component being of course inequality across individuals within each geographical unit or region). When spatial inequality goes up then, other things being equal, so does national inequality' (Kanbur, 2005, p. 11) . Therefore, one might expect that regional inequalities would fuel Marxist insurgencies through increased interpersonalverticalinequalities. Lessmann (2014) shows that personal and regional inequality is positively related.
But regional inequalities matter themselves, because they are by definition a type of horizontal inequalities. The arguments of Stewart (2000 Stewart ( , 2002 are also applicable to subnational jurisdictions. If inequalities between groupsformed by the inhabitants of different regions within a countryincrease, we should expect an increasing risk of internal conflict. Moreover, the effect should be stronger if regions are inhabited by different ethnic groups (see Esteban et al., 2012a) . Insofar, there is an overlap between ethnicity and regional inequality. Hechter (1975) argues that the regional income differentials stimulated the separatist mobilization of the Celtic fringe in Great Britain, while primordial nationalism was less relevant. This implies that regional inequalities might fuel nationalism of ethnic groups even if the ethnical distance between groups is small. 2 The question arises, how regional inequalities can affect the risk of internal conflict in homogeneous societies without large ethnic differences. Bolton and Roland (1997) analyze the breakup of nations in a political economy framework, where decisions in subnational regions are based on majority voting. A unified nation can realize efficiency gains (e.g., due to trade gains or economies of scale in public-good provision), but there are costs in loss of control on political decisionsin particular with regard to redistribution policies. Bolton and Roland allow income distributions to vary across and within regions. Thus, a uniform countrywide tax rate, which finances redistribution, will almost never coincide with the tax rates preferred by the median voter of a subnational unit. If efficiency gains from unification are small, rich regions have the incentive to separate, since decentralized redistribution policies match better with the preferences of local residents (see also Oates, 1972) . A quite similar tradeoff between efficiency gains from unification and political costs is stressed by Spolaore, 1997, 2003) in their model of the number and size of nations. Heterogeneity is introduced as geographical distance to a public good, which the authors assume to equal the distance in preferences. An increase in heterogeneity, which can be related to an increase in the heterogeneity of preferences due to a higher dispersion of incomes among regions, leads in this framework to smaller countries that can be formed through secession.
Based on the discussion of the theoretical literature, the main hypothesis of this study is:
Main hypothesis: The risk of internal conflict increases in the level of regional inequalities.
It is important to mention that recent theoretical and empirical findings by Esteban et al. (2012a, b) suggest that ethnic polarization and fractionalization are very important in predicting the incidence of civil wars. This implies that it is necessary to control for these factors in the empirical analysis in order to separate the effects of ethnicity from those of regional inequality. Therefore, I have based the empirical analysis on Esteban et al. (2012a) . 3 I use the same dataset and specifications, but I augment the estimation equation by a country-level indicator of regional inequality.
2. Ethnical distance can be understood as 'alienation' in the polarization theory of Esteban and Ray (1994 , 2012a , 2012b . 3. The dataset and Stata do-files used in Esteban et al. (2012a) can be downloaded through the website of the American Economic Review: http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/june2012/ 20100805_data.zip.
Related empirical literature
In the following brief review of existing empirical literature, I focus on crosscountry studies only and omit case studies on inequality and conflict, such as Hechter (1975) or Gourevitch (1979) among others. My study is also related to the literature on the determinants of regional inequalities, which studies for example development issues (see, e.g., Lessmann, 2014; Williamson, 1965) , international trade (see, e.g., Hirte and Lessmann, 2014; Rodr ıguez-Pose, 2012) , decentralization (see, e.g., Lessmann, 2012 ; Rodr ıguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010), and regional transfers (see, e.g., Kessler et al., 2011) . The strongest connecting element to these studies is the operationalization of regional inequalities, which reverts to the literature on economic geography (see section 3.1 for details). The empirical literature on inequality and conflict is extensive, although almost all studies are concerned with interpersonal income inequality (see Cramer, 2005; Lichbach, 1989 for literature surveys). Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) are the most influential studies in the field. Neither study finds a significant effect of income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, on the risk of internal conflict, measured through the onset of civil war. 4 However, the underlying inequality measure only considers vertical (or withingroup) inequality, not horizontal inequality, which is at the heart of this analysis. As the discussion of the previous section has shown, this may be an important limitation, which recent literature has tried to overcome.
There is a growing literature on ethnicity and conflict. While the initial studies by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) do not find significant effects of the degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization on the onset of civil wars, Esteban et al. (2012a, b) show that this result is related to measurement difficulties. The problem is that the degree of ethnic fractionalization increases monotonically in the number of groups, but the theoretical model by Esteban and Ray (2011a) implies that group size matters, too. The level of conflict is a function of ethnic fractionalization, polarization, and inequality. The theory is confirmed by Esteban et al. (2012a, b) insofar as horizontal inequalities between ethnic groups matter in predicting internal conflicts (see also Østby, 2008) . 5 Closely related to my study are Østby et al. (2009) (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000) , but they differ, for example, with regard to the inclusion of anticolonial wars. Data on interpersonal inequality come from Deininger and Squire (1996) . 5. Note that regional economic inequalities overlap to some extent with ethnic fractionalization (F), polarization (P), and ethnic difference (G/N), but are still distinct from them. The correlation between the ethnicity measures used in Esteban et al. (2012a) and the population-weighted coefficient of variation (WCV) of regional GDP per capita calculated based on Gennaioli et al. (2013) is summarized by Table A3 in the Appendix. The ethnicity and inequality measures are positively correlated with regional inequalities. The strongest correlation is between the degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalization and regional inequalities, implying that countries with many different ethnic groups are also heterogeneous with respect to differences in regional economic performance. However, the correlation is not very high, implying that regional inequalities are different.
al level as reported by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. Regional inequalities are considered by the regional relative deprivation (RRD) in household assets. 6 The source information comes from the Demographic and Health Surveys.
Since single (regional) observations of the inequality measure are correlated within countries, the authors estimate a logit model with standard errors clustered at the country level. 7 The study reveals that absolute welfare decreases the risk of internal conflict at the regional level, while the regional relative deprivation has no significant effect, if a linear relationship is considered. However, when considering a non-linear relationshipby adding a squared term in the RRD to the regressionthe authors find a curvilinear effect: only the poorest regions in the dataset have an increased probability for the onset of a civil war.
In light of this, the study supports the hypothesis that vertical inequalities have an effect on the risk of internal conflict. Deiwiks et al. (2012) focus on regional inequality and conflict in federations. Based on the regions of 31 countries covering the period 1991-2005, they find that regions which are rich or poor compared to the country mean have a higher likelihood to engage in secessionist conflict. The inequality measure is based on estimates of regional GDP based on the gridded output provided by the G-Econ Database, which provides data on about 100 countries and 27,000 terrestrial cells. 8 The data are available only for the year 1990. Buhaug et al. (2012) analyze the single cells of the G-Econ Database for the period 1991-2000. The dependent variable is the outbreak of a conflict within one cell at one point in time, the explanatory variables areamong othersthe gross cell income and its deviation from the country mean. The authors find no unconditional effect of regional inequality on internal conflict, but a strong interaction effect with national wealth, i.e. negative regional income deviations from the country mean increase the risk of conflict in very poor countries. Therefore, the study supports the results of Østby et al. (2009) .
Although these studies imply in unison that regional inequality increases the risk of conflict (at least in poor countries), there are still open research questions. As Buhaug et al. (2012) state in their conclusions, some technical problems could not be solved with the G-Econ database: "Since the existing disaggregated 6. The RRD is calculated as follows:
where M is the maximum of household assets, A 1 refers to the mean asset score of a given region i, and A 2 is the corresponding mean score of the country as a whole. 7. Note that Rogers (1993) and K ezdi (2004) demonstrate that standard errors are downward biased if the number of clusters (here countries) is smaller than 50. Therefore, the clustering of errors is not sufficient here to obtain unbiased estimates. 8. The authors calculate the gross regional product product per capita based on the gridded output provided by the G-Econ Database (see Nordhaus, 2006; Nordhaus et al., 2006 for details of the G-Econ Database). Gridded output means output per unit area, where the terrestrial cell has dimensions one degree of latitude and one degree of longitude. A problem with the geo-coded data is that the accuracy varies widely among countries (see Nordhaus, 2006, p. 3511) . While many different sources of regional economic and demographic data (regional employment, regional gross value added, regional employment by industry, etc.) are used to calculate gridded output in high-income countries such as the United States or Canada, output per unit of area in developing countries such as Nigeria is calculated only based on population census data and employment datano differences in productivity are taken into account. Therefore, the data quality varies with the (different) sources of regional data available, which may result in a bias.
income data that we have used here are limited to a single year it is difficult to assess changes over time. (. . .) Longitudinal data would allow examining in more detail how ethnic and social cleavages can interact with geographic inequalities in mobilization, conflict, as well as whether state redistributive efforts or accommodative policies to address inequalities may serve as alternatives to violence' (Buhaug et al., 2012, p. 833) .
In fact, this is one of the major contributions of the current study, since I combine the panel dataset of regional inequality used in Lessmann (2014) with recent conflict data. Moreover, I aggregate the regional income data to countrylevel inequality measures, which have several advantages. The most important advantage is that I can consider country fixed effects, which are very important for this sort of study, since there are numerous unobservable country specific factorslike history or geographythat might bias the estimates. Further extensions include the coverage of countries, the set of control variables, the estimation procedure, and the definition and measurement of internal conflicts, which is not limited to civil wars. I find that regional inequality unambiguously increases the risk of internal conflicts, whereas this result is not conditional on a particular country sample or the level of economic development.
DATA
Regional inequality
The main explanatory variable in the forthcoming empirical analysis is the level of regional inequality within countries. This paper makes use of two different data sets. In general, international databasessuch as the OECD Regional Statistics and the EUROSTAT Territorial Databaseonly provide regional economic accounts for highly developed countries, which is a serious drawback for our research question. On the other hand, the G-Econ database provides data only for the year 1990. However, we need time-varying regional economic accounts for high, middle, and low-income countries.
The first source of data is Lessmann (2014) , who collects data from national statistical offices and central banks on individual request, in addition to publicly available data sources. Lessmann (2014) calculates the WCV of regional GDP per capita within countries, which is widely used in economic geography (see, e.g., Williamson, 1965) :
Here, y is the country's average GDP p.c., y i is the GDP p.c. of region i, p i is the share of the country's total population in region i, and n is the number of spatial units. The advantages of this measure are that it is mean-independent, independent of the population sizes of regions, and robust against single extreme observations. Moreover, it satisfies the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (Dalton 1920; Pigou, 1912) , which states that a transfer from rich to poor regions should c.p. reduce the inequality measure (see Mehran, 1976; Sen, 1973 for details). Concerning the territorial level, Lessmann (2014) refers to regional data based on the OECD TL2 or NUTS2 level for OECD member countries, and on state-or province-level data otherwise. 9 The aim here was to collect data at that territorial level, which is as homogeneous as possible across countries in terms of the size of subnational regions.
It is important to note that the inequality measure (WCV) is affected by the geographic characteristics of a country, i.e. the territorial fragmentation and the population distribution. Given an equally distributed population within a country, the population-WCV is equal to the coefficient of variation (CV). In this case, the population weights p i are equal to 1/n, and the inequality measure is simply given by the ratio of standard deviation to mean, which ranges from 0 to ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi n À 1 p . Obviously, both the population distribution within a country as well as the territorial fragmentation (n) affect the inequality measure. The forthcoming empirical investigation has to take care of this issue by considering respective control variables. Note that this issue is only a concern in the cross-section analysis, with exploits the variation in the data between countries. The panel regressions with country fixed effects focus on the within country variation in the data over time, therefore, the (geographic) heterogeneity between countries is captured by the country dummy variables. 10 It may help the reader to understand this issue by comparing 'interpersonal income inequality' with 'interregional income inequality'. Studies on personal inequality are concerned with individuals, where all individuals usually get the same weight in the inequality measure, for example, the Gini coefficient. The range of the Gini coefficient is given by [0,1 À 1/n], and since the number of individuals is large, the upper boundary for perfect inequality is approximately 1 for all countries. However, if we are concerned with regional inequality, the heterogeneity of subnational regionswithin and across countrieshas to be considered. Table A1 in the Appendix presents means of the WCV for the most recent years, 2000-09, subdivided by the different regions of the world following the standard World Bank classification. The numbers suggest a link between regional inequality and development. High-income countries in the core of Europe, Scandinavia, and North America have much lower regional inequalities than lowand middle-income countries. But there are also interesting variations within the different country groups; for example, among the European countries the United Kingdom and Belgium have quite high spatial inequalities, while Denmark and the Netherlands are much more homogeneous.
The second source of regional data is provided by Gennaioli et al. (2013) . The underlying data sources have some overlap with Lessmann (2014) , but the territorial level is more heterogeneous. While Lessmann (2014) focuses on subnational units as defined by the OECD or EUROSTAT classifications, Gennaioli et al. (2013) focus on those subnational units which have the highest political autonomy. Another difference is that Lessmann (2014) uses only the regional GDP per capita, while Gennaioli et al. also consider wages and household income data as 9. Note that NUTS3-level data are used in those countries, where NUTS2 data are not reported. 10. Note that the general findings of this study are invariant to the particular measure of regional inequality. The correlation of the WCV used here and the (unweighted) CV is 0.93, and the correlation of the WCV with an (unweighted) Gini coefficient of regional incomes is 0.91.
proxy for the level of regional development. The dataset provided by Gennaioli et al. (2013) covers regional economic accounts of 110 countries for the year 2005, of which 98 can be used in the analysis. The population-WCV based on this dataset is reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. A closer look at the numbers shows that the results are quite similar to those for the dataset provided by Lessmann (2014) . The correlation of the inequality measures between the different data sets is 0.78. Both datasets have their pros and cons. The advantage of the dataset based on Lessmann (2014) is the panel structure, but it does not cover many low-income countries, in particular those from sub-Saharan Africa. That is the major advantage of the dataset based on Gennaioli et al. (2013) , which has the disadvantage of yielding no time variation. Due to these important differences, I make use of both datasets in the forthcoming econometric analysis.
Internal conflict
The main response variable in the econometric analysis is the incidence of civil war. In that respect, I follow closely Esteban et al. (2012a) . I use the most recent conflict data provided jointly by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the Peace Research Institute Oslo [UCDP/ PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2010 , 1946 ; see Harbom and Wallensteen (2010) Armed conflicts are defined as follows:
An armed conflict is defined [. . .] as a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Of these two parties, at least one has to be the government of a state. The incompatibility is the stated (in writing or verbally) generally incompatible positions (Harbom and Wallensteen, 2010, p. 508). 11 The intensity of conflicts is considered by classifying the data into three categories: (1) armed conflicts, with at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and per incompatibility (PRIO25); (2) intermediate armed conflicts, which include armed conflicts with a minimum of 1,000 deaths over the course of the conflict (PRIO-CW); (3) wars, with a threshold of battle-related deaths of at least 1,000 per year and per incompatibility (PRIO1000). In the analysis, a country is coded as having experienced a conflict in a given period if, in any of the years within this period, the corresponding threshold condition has been met. I mainly focus on armed conflicts (PRIO25) and use the alternative classifications for robustness tests. Note that I also provide robustness tests using alternativenot binary-codedconflict variables (see section 4.4 for details). As Esteban et al. (2012a) point out, this conflict measure is different to the onset of civil wars, which reflects whether a fresh conflict breaks out in the period of observation.
The incidence of conflict varies for the different regional datasets used, which results in different country samples. In the estimations which use the data provided by Gennaioli et al. (2013) , there are 207 country-period pairs with an armed conflict (PRIO25) within a total of 876 observations of five year period 11. A more detailed definition can be found on UCDP's webpage, at http://www.ucdp.uu.se.
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averages of 98 countries. That is a share of conflict periods of 24%. The incidence of conflict is lower in the sample of countries covered by Lessmann (2014) , where I count 38 conflicts within 196 observations (19%). However, internal conflicts are a quite common phenomenon in both data sets.
The binary conflict variables have two important drawbacks. First, they do not vary much over time, in particular in highly developed countries that have experienced very few conflicts since the end of the Second World War. Second, the variables capture only those conflicts which involve government troops in open fights. However, as mentioned in the introduction, this is just one dimension of internal conflicts. One conflicting party might also choose to engage in terror attacks or to organize riots in order to achieve its aims.
Therefore, I also consider the variable 'risk of internal conflict' provided by the PRS Group's International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). These data have previously been used by economists (see, e.g., Gupta et al., 2004; Jinjarak, 2009 ) as well as political scientists (see, e.g., Long, 2008; Neumayer, 2004) . I have access to the data for the period 1984-2005. The index is created from an annual survey of experts who rate a country's risk of conflict in three categories: civil war and coup threat, terrorism and political violence, and civil disorder. The highest rating is given to those countries where there is no armed or civil opposition to the government and the government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct, or indirect, against its own people. The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an ongoing civil war. The risk rating assigned is the sum of the three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of 4 points and a minimum score of 0 points. A score of 4 points equates to very low risk, and a score of 0 points to very high risk. Thus, the index ranges from 0 to 12, and the highest score indicates no risk of internal conflict. I have rescaled the index in such a manner that the highest value is given to the countries with the highest risk of internal conflict, to make interpretation of results easier.
To give a first impression of the data, Table 1 shows the five countries with the highest and the five with the lowest risk of internal conflict in the last year of the observation period (2005) . Note that I only consider those countries where I have regional accounts in at least one of the two data sources. The data show no surprises: the Democratic Republic of Congo was the country with the highest risk of internal conflict, and Switzerland the country with the lowest. Concerning volatility of the risk of internal conflict, El Salvador, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates are the countries with the highest standard deviation of One advantage of the risk data is that the surveyed country experts rate the risk of conflict gradually, the threat of a conflict being already taken into consideration. This is an important feature for the economic consequences. The increasing risk of civil wars, terrorist attacks, and civil disorder will discourage investments. Investors are afraid of expropriation and deterioration of the physical capital in the conflicting countries. As a result, the capital stock and economic growth will be lower, the higher the risk of conflict. For this to happen, it is not necessary that an armed conflicts should break out. But nothing comes without a cost. The risk of internal conflict might also react on international terrorism, which can produce variation in the data which cannot be explained through standard determinants of internal conflict. Moreover, the data are not as objective as the binary civil war data, since the country risk ratings are based on expert surveys.
Given the pros and cons of the ICRG index compared to the conflict data provided by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, the question arises how the different datasets are related. One way to compare the conflict measures is to calculate Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, which is suitable to study categorical data. Table A4 in the Appendix provides the results for all different variables of internal conflict used in the paper including the index of social conflict (ISC) provided by the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS), which is used in the robustness section. 12 The correlation of the ICRG index with the UCDP/ PRIO data ranges from 0.38 to 0.50. Obviously, the correlation is higher the broader the definition of conflicts, which is not surprising given its construction. Given the correlation between the ICRG index and the UCDP/PRIO data, we can conclude that both conflict measures point in the same direction, but still contain different information.
EMPIRICAL MODEL
I parse my research question by estimating variants of different panel data models. The data and econometric methodology are similar to Esteban et al. (2012a) . The basic regression for N countries and T time periods, where countries are indexed by i and time by t, has the following form:
where C i,t is the incidence of armed internal conflict, X k,i,t represents q different control variables, WCV i,t is the population-weighted coefficient of variation of the regional GDP per capita as measure for the level of regional inequality, a i is the country fixed effect, d t is the time fixed effect, and e i,t is a random error term.
12. The correlations are based on five year period averages for 494 country-year observations.
The main coefficient of interest is c, which I expect to be positive. In the literature on the determinants of civil wars there is an ongoing controversy about whether to use annual data or period-averaged data (see Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon, 2005) . I follow Esteban et al. (2012a) and calculate five year period averages covering the period 1960-2009. The binary conflict variable is assigned the value 1 if an internal conflict was observed in one of the five years of a period. I make use of two different datasets of regional economic accounts and two different measures of conflict. The inequality measures calculated based on Lessmann (2014) are time-varying, as is the risk of internal conflict from the International Country Risk Guide. Therefore, I can also consider a panel fixed effects model. Using country fixed effects reduces a potential endogeneity bias of the estimates caused by omitted (country-specific, unobservable) variables. The historical background of a country (e.g., its colonial past), its past experience in external wars, and its geography are examples of such unobservable factors. Using country fixed effects eliminates the unobserved heterogeneity between countries, thereby reducing this potential source of bias.
In the following, I estimate logit models as well as ordinary least squares (OLS) models. Logit estimates are carried out where I use the binary conflict data from PRIO as dependent variable. Note that I use the same dataset and the Stata dofiles provided by Esteban et al. (2012a) , augmenting the estimation equation with the measure of regional inequality (and some other geographic controls discussed later) as additional explanatory variable. OLS regressions are carried out where I use the risk of internal conflict as a dependent variable combined with country fixed effects.
Concerning the selection of control variables, I follow Esteban et al. (2012a) . Thereby, I consider the population size, the GDP per capita, the natural resource endowment, geographic variables, and institutional variables. Most importantly, the incidence of civil war and the risk of internal conflict are deeply affected by past realizations of the respective measure, so I use lagged conflict as an additional control in all specifications. The detailed definitions and data sources of all variables considered in the econometric analysis are provided by Table A5 in the Appendix. Summary statistics are provided by Table  A6 in the Appendix.
First, I present regression results using the inequality measures based on Lessmann (2014): section 4.1 presents the results of logit estimations using the PRIO data as dependent variable; section 4.2 presents results of fixed effects OLS estimations using the ICRG index 'risk of internal conflict'. Second, I present regression results using the regional accounts provided by Gennaioli et al. (2013) , which increases the number of countries significantly, but the measure of regional inequality does not vary over time: section 4.4 presents logit estimates using the PRIO data; section 4.4 presents estimations with alternative conflict measures as robustness check.
To get a first impression of how regional inequality affects internal conflict, I have calculated the mean of the measure of regional inequality within the country-period pairs with and without an armed conflict. In the group of observations with an armed conflict, the population-WCV is on average 0.41, while it is 0.33 in the group of observations without conflict. A quite similar result can be obtained if the measure of regional inequality is plotted against the ICRG index 'risk of internal conflict'. Figure 1 shows a scatterplot using the regional inequality measures based on Lessmann (2014) . The figure suggests a positive correlation, i.e., the higher the regional inequalities within countries, the higher is the risk of internal conflict.
Baseline estimates with PRIO25
The baseline results are presented in Table 2 . There I reproduce the estimations presented in Table 1 of Esteban et al. (2012a Esteban et al. ( , 2012b p. 1319), adding the level of regional inequalities within countries as an additional explanatory variable. Regional inequalities are calculated based on Lessmann (2014) . The sample consists of 51 countries and covers the period 1980-2009. In all cases, I compute robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the country level.
Each column in the table contains a specification of equation (2), where I progressively add control variables. Column 1 uses the population and the different distributional indices considered by Esteban et al. (2012a) as control variables. The distributional indices are ethnic polarization (P), fractionalization (F), and the Greenberg-Gini index (G/N) (see Esteban and Ray, 2011a for details). Column 2 adds in lagged conflict. Column 3 adds in the GDP per capita. Column 4 considers a dummy for whether a country produces oil and/or diamonds. Column 5 factors in geographical controls, which are quite important in my model (see discussion in section 3.1). Besides the link between the population distribution and territorial fragmentation and the measure regional inequality, geography might itself be important. As Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue, insurgency is favored by rough terrain and a non-contiguous territory, since it provides rebels safe retreat areas. Column 6 brings in the standard political control for democracy. 13 Column 7 adds in more political and governance controls.
Throughout, the coefficient of the indicator of regional inequalities is positive as expected. The effect is statistically significant in the specifications reported in columns 1, 5, 6, and 7. Obviously, the consideration of geographic controls is very important, as indicated by the results reported in column 5. Here, the effect of regional inequalities becomes highly significant. This result is robust to the inclusion of the political controls (columns 6 and 7). The population size is positively associated with conflict in some of the specifications. Lagged conflict is positive and highly significant. The GDP per capita has no effect in this sample of countries, which is biased towards highly developed countries. Similarly, natural resources have no significant effect on conflict. Finally, in line with Esteban et al. (2012a) , the effect of ethnic fractionalization is positive and significant. However, the other ethnic variables have no robust effects, which are again related to the different country sample. Note that the results of Esteban et al. (2012a) will be confirmed in the broader dataset used in section 4.3. I conclude from these estimations that regional inequalities increase the probability of armed conflicts, in support of the hypothesis stated in section 2.1 ( Table 2) .
As a robustness check, I have also considered lagged values of the measure of regional inequality instead of contemporaneous values. It is reasonable to expect that the GDP per capita of subnational regions involved in a conflict will be lower during the course of conflict. Therefore, regional inequalities may also be affected by internal conflicts. The sign and magnitude of the effect depend on whether the conflict concentrates on relatively rich or poor regions within a country. As consequence, a problem of reverse causation might occur, imposing an endogeneity bias on the coefficient estimates. To deal with this possibility, I have repeated the estimations using a one-period (five year average) lagged value of the measure of regional inequality as an explanatory variable. The results are reported in Table A7 in the Appendix and confirm the findings discussed above.
Country fixed effects estimates with ICRG conflict index
The results presented in the previous section may be biased by omitted variables. There are numerous country-specific factors that might affect internal conflicts, which are unobservable or difficult to measure. For example, former colonial countries might have a higher risk of internal conflict, since the regions are often very heterogeneous in several respects (ethnicity, geography, size, etc.) . These heterogeneities are related to the sometimes arbitrary demarcation of countries during the colonial era. Also, an unequal distribution of resources (water, oil, minerals, etc.) among the different regions of a country may affect conflict.
Therefore, it is important to check the robustness of results using country fixed effects. The country dummies capture the unobserved heterogeneity in the 13. Studies on regional inequality usually control for the number of spatial units, area, etc. In this analysis, I decided to stick closely to the framework of Esteban et al. (2012a Esteban et al. ( , 2012b for reasons of comparability. Adding further geographic controls does not change the results, since the population distribution and the fragmentation depend on the terrain. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
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data. I utilize the ICRG index 'risk of internal conflict' as the dependent variable, since it has more variation over time than the civil war data. The results of OLS regressions using similar control variables to those in the previous section are presented in Table 3 . Note that time-invariant control variables are dropped from the regression, due to their perfect collinearity with the country fixed effects. Importantly, the measure of regional inequality has a positive and significant effect on the risk of internal conflict. It has even more explanatory power than the lagged value of the conflict measure. In this fixed effects model, also the resource variables have a positive effect, implying that the new discovery of resources increases the risk of internal conflict. This finding is in line with Collier and Hoeffler (2004). 4.3. Estimates with PRIO25 and regional inequality measures based on Gennaioli et al. (2013) In this subsection, I estimate the empirical model using the inequality measures calculated based on Gennaioli et al. (2013) . This increases the number of countries significantly over the baseline model, at the cost of the total loss of time variation in the data. The dependent variable is the incidence of armed conflict (PRIO25); therefore I present logit estimates. Notes: t-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
In addition to the standard control variables, I also consider regional dummies for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and for South Asia (SA). My estimations show that the baseline model is not able to predict the incidence of internal conflict very well for these two groups of countries, perhaps because ethnic conflicts are less important here. While regional dummies for sub-Saharan Africa and the other regions of the world have no significant effects, the dummies MENA and SA have very strong effects. One reason for this is that the MENA countries have faced different internal and external conflicts due to incompatible territorial claims during the observation period, which have led to shifts of borders. Examples are the conflicts between Israel, Syria, Egypt, and Palestine over the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, and the West Bank and Gaza. At least in the case of Israel vs. Palestine, it is difficult to classify the conflict as internal or external. This brings up another problem, which is that there are missing values among the regional economic accounts for regions under conflict. The PRIO data classify the conflict between Israel and Palestine as internal armed conflict. But regional data are not available for the West Bank and Gaza; therefore, the measure of regional inequality for Israel is biased downward. Similaralthough not that obviousproblems occur in 12 of the 98 countries in the sample. I have addressed this problem by adding a dummy variable (MISSING) for those countries where data on one or more subnational regions of a country are missing. Finally, I control for the degree of territorial fragmentation (FRAG) of a country, measured by the average size of subnational regions. The regional data provided by Gennaioli et al. (2013) cover many low-and middle-income countries, where the territorial classifications are not comparable with those of OECD countries. This heterogeneity can affect the measure of regional inequality. The results are reported in Table 4 .
The coefficient of the measure of regional inequality is positive and significant in most of the specifications. Again, this is so whether the geographic controls are considered or not (column 4 and column 5). The sign and significance of the standard control variables are in line with Esteban et al. (2012a) . In this broader dataset, all three ethnic variables show the expected signs andwith the exception of the Greenberg-Gini indexare statistically significant. Concerning the additional control variables, the degree of territorial fragmentation has a negative sign, i.e., the larger the average size of subnational units, the lower is the risk of internal conflict. The coefficient of the dummy variable for countries where regional income data are missing is positive. This is quite suggestive, since the countries with regions under conflict are not able to report regional economic accounts for the conflict region. The MENA and SA suggest that the incidence of internal conflict is higher in these regions, which cannot be explained by the other control variables.
It is important to mention that the inclusion of the MENA dummy is crucial to get a significant effect for the measure of regional inequality in this country sample. Without the regional fixed effect, I do not get significant results in this country sample. The main finding is also obtained and significant if I exclude MENA countries from the dataset. If that is done, the effect of regional inequalities on conflict is positive and significant without considering the additional controls. In general, the controls considered in addition to those used by Esteban 
Different conflict variables
Up to this point, my analysis has used the binary conflict variable PRIO25 and the ICRG index 'risk of internal conflict'. PRIO reports other indicators, including non-binary alternatives, which I use for robustness tests in this section. Therein I follow closely Esteban et al. (2012a) . The results reported in Table 5 reproduce Table 3 of Esteban et al. (2012a Esteban et al. ( , 2012b p. 1323), but the equation is augmented with the measure of regional inequality (based on, Gennaioli et al., 2013) and the full set of standard and additional control variables. Column 1 reproduces the results reported in column 7 from the baseline specification for reasons of better comparability. Column 2 focuses on intermediate conflicts (PRI-OCW) . Column 3 considers civil wars (PRIO1000). Column 4 reports results of a non-binary measure of conflict intensity (PRIOINT). The variable has the value 0 for episodes of 'peace', the value 1 for events that satisfy PRIO25 but not PRIO1000, and the value 2 for PRIO1000 events. Column 5 considers an alternative continuous measure of conflict intensity. For this, I use the index of social conflict (ISC) provided by the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS). Column 6 reports results using the ICRG index 'risk of internal conflict', which has not yet been combined with the broader dataset of regional inequalities. The effect of the measure of regional inequality is positive and significant for all specifications that use categorial PRIO data as well as in the specification that uses the measure ISC of conflict intensity (columns 2-5). In the regression that uses the ICRG index 'risk of internal conflict' as dependent variable, the coefficient of the measure of regional inequality is positive as expected, but the effect is not significant at conventional confidence levels. However, the t-value is quite high (1.60). I conclude from this exercise that the effect of regional inequality on internal conflicts is robust to these measurement issues.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies the influence of regional income inequalities within countries on internal conflict. I argue, based on the existing theoretical literature, that regional inequalities increase the risk of internal conflict. Regional inequalities are a particular type of horizontal inequalities, which are expected to be a major determinant of conflict (see Stewart, 2000) . This hypothesis is tested empirically using cross-country and panel data. Regional inequalities are measured by the population-WCV of regional GDP per capita within countries, which is commonly used in economic geography (see, e.g., Williamson, 1965) . Two data sources are used: Lessmann (2014) , who provides unique panel data on 56 countries (835 subnational regions) covering the period 1980 , and Gennaioli et al. (2013 , who provide cross-section data on 110 countries (1569 subnational regions) for the year 2005. Conflict is measured by the incidence of civil war as reported by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the Peace Research Institute Oslo, and the measure 'risk of internal conflict' reported by the PRS Group's International Country Risk Guide. The econometric analysis shows that regional inequalities within countries increase the risk of internal conflict. This finding is robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects, regional fixed effects, and alternative conflict measures. In contrast to previous studies this result is not limited to a particular country sample or other conditioning factors such as the level of economic development.
The policy implications of this work are straightforward. Policies that reduce regional inequalities might also contribute to a reduction in the risk of internal conflicts. This might save life and stimulate economic growth. The difficult question is, however, which policies are appropriate. One instrument might be the decentralization of the public sector. A number of studies, such as Lessmann (2009) , Rodr ıguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2010), and Lessmann (2012), find decentralization to reduce regional inequalities overall, but the effects are not significant in developing countries. Therefore, this policy instrument is only suitable for high-income countries. Another instrument might be fiscal transfers which aim at an equalization of living standards; they are common in many federations such as Germany or Canada. However, the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of such transfers in reducing regional inequalities points at precisely the reverse relationship (see Kessler et al., 2011) . The reason is that regional transfers undermine the household's incentive to migrate from poor to rich regions, thus inhibiting the natural convergence process.
In light of this, it seems more appropriate to foster policies that aim to increase the mobility of people. This may include infrastructure investments or education policies, since highly educated people have a higher probability to migrate. Moreover, a recent study by Gennaioli et al. (2013) shows that differences in human capital are the major cause of differences in regional growth. Therefore, policies which aim at a better education in poor regions of a country might also reduce the risk of conflict. ICRG index 'risk of internal conflict' as reported by the PRS Group's International Country Risk Guide. The index is created from an annual survey of experts who rate a country's risk of conflict in three categories: civil war and coup threat, terrorism and political violence, and civil disorder.
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(3) ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
